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WHAT HAVE WE LEARNT ABOUT BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AS A BUSINESS 




This article examines whether board gender diversity influences the voluntary formation of its Board 
Sub-committees. Board gender diversity has been measured as a proportion and with Blau’s index. The 
results show that independent female directors on a board are positively associated with the likelihood 
of voluntarily setting up all or some of the Committees and a Supervision and Control Committee. The 
presence of executive female directors on boards negatively influences the probability of forming all or 
some of the Committees, an Executive Committee and a Supervision and Control Committee. The 
percentage of shares held by female directors has a positive effect on the voluntary creation of an 
Executive Committee. The findings also report that women directors and institutional female directors 
do not contribute to the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees. The results show that the demand 
for internal control mechanism as Board Sub-committees, depends on the female directorship on boards.  
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Past research has considered Board Sub-committees as a relevant mechanism of corporate governance 
since they may reduce agency costs (Ngoc Bich Tao and Marion Hutchinson 2013) and protect 
shareholders’ interests (J. Richard Harrison 1987). Nevertheless, corporate governance literature has 
paid little attention to the influence of board gender diversity on the voluntary creation of Board Sub-
committees. 
Past research focused on corporate governance, management and gender diversity literature (see e.g., 
Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira  2009; Sabina Nielsen and Morten Huse 2010) evidenced that 
gender diversity may affect the functioning and efficiency of corporate boards and committees. 
Previous research supports the hypothesis that board gender diversity improves the decision-making 
process of the board of directors (BD’s) (Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb, Arun Upadhyay, and 
Wanli Zhao 2011), enhances corporate governance control, as women directors are considered to be 
stricter monitors, and reduces malpractice (Joe Ueng, Daryl Koehn, and Ching Liang Chang 2009), 
among other things, which mitigates agency conflicts (C. Francoeur, Labelle, R. and B. Sinclair-
Desgnané 2008). In addition, women directors are usually given riskier tasks than their men colleagues, 
and they outperform male board members (Michelle K. Ryan and S. Alexander Haslam 2007) since 
they foster good corporate practice (Zena Burgess and Phyllis Tharenou 2002). In this sense, Glass, 
Cook and Ingersoll (2016) provide evidence that companies with women leathering teams are more 
effective than other firms at pursuing corporate social responsibility strategies. Therefore, given the 
importance of women on boards in allocating capital to corporations, their role in firm corporate 
governance (Kevin Campbell and Antonio Mínguez-Vera 2008; Siri Terjesen, Ruth Sealy and Val 
Singh 2009), and the fact that previous research fails to identify the impact that female directors on 
boards have on the voluntary setting up of Board committees, an understanding of how gender diversity 
on corporate boards affects the voluntary formation of Board Sub-committees is undoubtedly needed. 
Thus, the aim of this study is to analyse the effect of board gender diversity on the voluntary setting up 
of Board Sub-committees.  
Our research contributes to the corporate governance literature in several ways. First, we demonstrate 
that the demand for Board Sub-committees can vary depending on the structure of a Spanish Board’s 
gender diversity. Specifically, our results show that one way in which women directors might play a 
role in monitoring management is through affecting the demand for control mechanisms, such as Board 
Sub-committees. Thus, we provide evidence that some characteristics of women directors, such as 
independence and ownership, may be useful for stakeholders, such as financial information users or 
shareholders, by enhancing the demand for Board Sub-committees, which suggests that female directors 
who are in a position to exert significant influence may increase the voluntary formation of Board Sub-
committees. Second, we find evidence of substitutive effects between an Executive Committee and 
executive female directors on BDs, which suggests that Board Sub-committees, in general, and an 
Executive Committee, in particular, should not be considered in isolation. In sum, these results suggest 
that a one-size-fits-all solution for the creation of Board Sub-committees might not be optimal, as 
different firms face different incentives in composing their BD’s. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional setting while Section 3 
detailed the existing literature. Section 4 describes the empirical design and Section 5 reports the results. 
And finally, Section 6 provides concluding remark. 
 
2. Institutional Setting 
Spanish corporate governance system provides an opportunity to investigate the effect of board gender 
diversity on the voluntary setting up of Board Sub-committees, since it is characterised by the presence 
of a few large shareholders, weak investor protection, market control less active in comparison to 
Anglo-Saxon markets, high ownership concentration and a one-tier board system (all directors, non-
executives and executives make up one board). Accordingly, this high ownership concentration acts as a 
legal control that influences Spanish corporate governance (Thomas Kirchmaier and Jeremy Grant 
2005). These features are the board of directors’ prevalent mechanism of control, as is the presence as 
directors of large block-holders, who are known as institutional directors. These directors play a 
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significant role, because they have an important position on boards to represent the interests of large 
shareholders and institutional investors (Kirchmaier and Grant 2005). Accordingly, Spain is the 
European country with the highest presence of institutional investors on the boards of large firms 
(Alberto De Miguel, Julio Pindado, and Chabela De La Torre 2004), in contrast with the Anglo-
American context, where it is less common for institutional investors to be appointed as directors on a 
board.  
In this context, Spain has published a set of codes of Corporate Governance in order to improve the 
confidence and transparency of the markets and to protect the wealth of minority shareholders. In this 
line, these codes recommended the establishment of Board Committees to perform tasks that are 
complementary to those of the BD. In this line, The Aldama Report (2003) recommended the creation 
of an Executive Committee, a Nomination and Compensation Committee and a Strategy and Investment 
Committee, also emphasising the creation of an Audit Committee, which is mandatory for listed firms. 
However, the CUBG (2006) omitted the Strategy and Investment Committee that drove the Aldama 
Report (2003), as the skills developed by this Committee were typical of the BD. It recognised the 
usefulness that a Corporate Governance Committee has for some firms, but generally, did not consider 
the need to recommend its creation. According to the Audit Committees, the Law on Measures to 
Reform the Financial System (LMRFS) of 2002 obliged listed firms to establish Audit Committees, 
with the objective of reviewing the financial statements of the firms before forwarding them to the BD 
and, therefore, they ceased to be a recommendation for listed firms and became an obligation.  
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the sustained socio-economic changes in Spain in recent years have 
increased gender diversity on BD’s. This increase was enhanced by the implementation of the Conthe 
Code (2006), and its proposals are intended to support a female presence. However, it was the 
implementation of Act 3/2007 of 22 March, for Effective Equality between Women and Men (LOIMH), 
Article 75, which frames the regulation of the appointment of men and women on BDs in an equitable 
form. In fact, the LOIMH (2007) recommended that Spanish boards of listed companies reached a 
gender quota of 40% by 2015 (a detailed analysis of gender quotas for BDs in several countries can be 
found in Siri Terjesen, Ruth V. Aguilera and Ruth Lorenz 2015). The Conthe Code was updated in 
2015, which suggests listed firms to reach a gender quota of 30% by 2020. According to Heidrick and 
Struggles (2014) survey, the proportion of women directors on Spanish listed firm’s boards has 
enhanced from 9% in 2011 to 13% in 2013. 
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses  
Agency theory posits that the separation between the ownership (principal) and control of a firm (agent) 
generates information asymmetries between the parties, because of the difficulty that owners face in 
assessing the behaviour of managers (Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling 1976). Therefore, 
firms have increased the demand for internal and external controls in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and agency costs. In this line, corporate governance literature shows that BD’s is a crucial 
mechanism based on the premise that the characteristics of the board members determine the board’s 
ability to monitor and control managers, provide information and counsel to managers, monitor 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and link the corporation to the external environment 
(David A. Carter, Betty J. Simkins, and W. Gary Simpson 2010). Thus, the BD is the main internal 
mechanism for resolving agency conflicts within the firm (Michael C. Jensen 1993), focusing 
principally on monitoring management team behaviour (Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. 
Weisbach 1991). However, firms demand control mechanisms other than the BD, such as Board Sub-
committees (also known as Board Committees), in order to reduce agency costs and information 
asymmetries, as well as to help it carry out its activities efficiently and independently (Harrison 1987). 
In this vein, authors such as Hugh D. Sherman, Roger J. Kashlak, and Maheshkumar P. Joshi (1998), 
among others, found that the major decisions made by BDs came from Board Sub-committees. The firm 
director of Roebuck and Firm noted in 1999 that firms are run primarily by their committees. Harrison 
(1987) demonstrated that the Control Committees were important management mechanisms for BDs to 
independently perform oversight functions. Audra L. Boone and J. Harold Mulherin (2012) showed that 
the creation of Board Sub-committees increased oversight functions and, thus, reduced agency 
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problems. P. Wolnizer (1995) demonstrated that the principal operations performed by Board Sub-
committees were the controlling and monitoring of the development and subsequent disclosure of 
accounting information. In a similar manner, Ruigrok et al. (2006) showed that the delegation of 
functions by the BD to Sub-committees increased the quality of the activities of the BD. Christian Laux 
and Volker Laux (2009) revealed that the Delegate Committees, at times, worked independently in 
order to achieve the objectives set by the corporate governance codes. However, sometimes, a single 
committee performed the combined functions of various committees. 
Academic research has failed to show a relationship between board gender diversity and the demand for 
control mechanisms such as Board Sub-committees.  
Female directors on corporate boards might act as a control mechanism over managers by supervising 
board duties and, consequently, agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and management 
could be reduced (Francoeur et al. 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; David. A. Carter, Frank D’Souza, 
Betty J. Simkins, and W. Gary Simpson 2010) by demanding the formation of control mechanisms such 
as Board Sub-committees. Thus, female directors may monitor management more effectively than men 
directors (Bin Srinidhi, Ferdinand A. Gul, and Judy Tsui 2011). In this line, agency theory posits that 
board gender diversity may increase its effectiveness because women directors increase board 
independence (Carter et al. 2010), their perspectives are more wide-ranging and their decision-making 
processes are more extensive and, as a result, this may also lead to higher demands for control 
mechanisms. In the same vein, Nanette Fondas and Susan Sassalos (2000) indicated that women tend to 
have higher expectations regarding their responsibilities as directors, which may induce them to use 
more effort on their tasks.  
Women on corporate boards lead to a greater diversity of knowledge and skills (Ruigrok et al. 2006; 
Nielsen and Huse 2010; Lucas-Pérez et al. 2014), and tend to increase the innovation activities for the 
companies (Horbach and Jacob, 2018) and provide different perspectives and opinions, which 
influences democratic decision-making (Elizabeth Webb 2004; Nielsen and Huse 2010). Authors like 
Pierpaolo Parrotta and Nina Smith (2013) and Alexa A. Perryman, Guy D. Fernando, and Arindam 
Tripathy (2016) report that women directors on boards are more risk averse in decision making, more 
conservative than men and less overconfident in their decision-making (Michael Dowling and Zakaria 
Ali Aribi 2013). 
Thus, these perspectives seem to support the view that women directors on boards are more likely to 
demand control mechanisms. Consequently, we predict that female directors on BD’s may have a 
positive effect on the demand for corporate governance mechanisms such as Board Sub-committees. 
Therefore, it is expected that, as the presence of women directors on BDs increases, the likelihood of 
the creation of Board Sub-committees will be greater, as female directors on BDs will demand more 
control mechanisms with which to exercise greater supervision and monitoring of both the management 
team and other members of the BD, making better decisions that positively impact shareholders.  
Hence, we posit the following hypothesis:  
 Hypothesis 1: Women directors on Boards are positively associated with the voluntary creation 
of Board Sub-committees. 
 
Agency theory also argues that independent directors on boards act as good monitors for shareholders' 
interests, reducing agency problems and opportunistic conducts (Ruigrok et al. 2006; Christopher S. 
Armstrong, John E. Core, and Wayne R. Guay 2014). Thus, independent directors may improve the 
decision-making process and enhance the supervision over management (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen 1983). In this line, independent members of corporate boards 
will support the creation of Board Sub-committees, as such Committees may reduce information 
asymmetries between directors and enhance the confidence of the owners and investors in the firms. 
Past research reports that independent directors on boards increase the voluntary creation of Audit 
Committees (María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez and Cristina De Fuentes-Barbera 2008), Risk 
Management Committees (Puan Yatim 2010), Oversight Committees (Julie Cotter and Mark Silvester 
2003) and Board Sub-committees (Henry Huang, Gerald J. Lobo, and Jian Zhou 2009), among others. 
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Building on cognitive psychology, sociology, economic and management literature, and focusing on 
gender diversity on corporate boards, authors such as Carter et al. (2003) support the idea that board 
gender diversity increases board independence, because directors with more traditional backgrounds do 
not ask the questions that would be asked by directors of a different gender, ethnicity or cultural 
background. Chi-keung Man and Brossa Wong (2013) posit that women directors can develop trust 
leadership, which requires managers to share information, and they are more likely to be risk-averse to 
fraud and opportunistic earnings management. In this line, other studies (Terjesen et al. 2009) also 
suggest that women directors can monitor managers’ and CEOs’ behaviour better and more effectively 
than male directors (Carter et al. 2003) through holding more informed discussions, having better 
communication skills, featuring better independent thinking, serving on monitoring-related committees, 
such as an Audit Committee, Nominating Committee or Corporate Governance Committee, and 
increasing board attendance, among other things, which is critical to check opportunistic activities and 
provide better control over management.  
The assumed benefits of improved independence on corporate boards stems from the belief that 
independent directors are better monitors of management than inside directors (Mark L. DeFond and 
Jere R. Francis 2006). Thus, combining independence and the qualities of women directors, in 
comparison to their male counterparts, a positive influence of independent female directors on the 
setting up of Board Sub-committees would be expected, because they would have more freedom to 
demand them. Consequently, according to the previously discussed views, we predict that, as 
independent women directors on BDs increase, the greater is the likelihood of establishing Board Sub-
committees, as this will allow them to conduct more comprehensive control over the management of the 
firm. In this sense, Francoeur et al. (2008) also suggest that incorporating independent female directors 
on BDs will allow better exercise of the supervision and control functions. 
Hence, we posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
 Hypothesis 2: Independent women directors on Boards are positively associated with the 
voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees 
 
Executive directors on corporate boards provide only a restricted amount of information to non-
executive directors in order to prevent stakeholders from obtaining all the information (Armstrong et al. 
2014). The dominance of executive directors results in weak control mechanisms within the 
management structure, because they may have incentives to align with management in order to 
maximise their value and/or their own wealth at the expense of shareholders (Messod D. Beneish 2001). 
Executive directors on BDs also provide knowledge about the inner workings of the firm because of 
their relationships within the company, and they possess confidential information about the company 
(Eugene CM Cheng and Stephen M. Courtenay 2006). In this vein, Barry Baysinger and Robert E. 
Hoskisson (1990) argue that executive directors on BDs have more information and knowledge with 
which to evaluate strategic decisions.  
Academic literature shows the negative impact of executive directors on BDs on financial disclosure 
(Cheng and Courtenay 2006), firm performance (Yu Liu, Zuobao Wei, and Feixue Xie 2014) and 
business failure (Hwa-Hsien Hsu and Chloe Yu-Hsuan Wu 2014), among other things. In the same vein, 
Emiliano Ruíz-Barbadillo, Estíbaliz Biedma-López, and Nieves Gómez-Aguilar (2007) demonstrate 
that executive directors on BDs increase management dominance over the board and, therefore, these 
directors are less likely to support the voluntary formation of Board Sub-committees, because these 
control mechanisms may monitor management actions.  
Cognitive psychology, sociology and management literature posits that females are generally more risk-
averse, more conservative and behave more ethically than males (Leora F. Klapper and Simon C. Parker 
2011; Parrotta and Smith 2013; Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, John Chool Park, and Qiang Wu. 2014; 
Perryman et al. 2016), which may influence corporate decisions and enhance the demand for control 
mechanisms. Kris Hardies, Ann Jorissen, and Parichart Maneemai (2014) find that women directors feel 
that there is more need for planning and are less overconfident than males, negatively impacting on firm 
performance. Contrary to this evidence, other papers (K. V. Petrides and Adrian Furnham 2006) report 
that there are no significant differences in the behaviors of male and female executives, and there are 
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many similarities in the specific skills displayed by them, such as risk taking, as well as in the 
managerial roles performed. In the same vein, Gary N. Powell (1990) does not report evidence to 
support differences in executive men and women's task-oriented and people-oriented behaviour and 
their leadership styles. 
According to previous arguments and evidence, female executive directors are likely to behave the same 
as male executives and, therefore, both executive women and men directors will align with 
management, as suggested by the academic literature (Beneish 2001). Thus, we predict that executive 
female directors on BDs decrease the probability of the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees, as 
these committees involve more supervision and control of executive functions and management and, as 
a result, they will be reluctant to demand control mechanisms. 
Hence, we posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
 Hypothesis 3: Executive female directors on the Board of Directors are negatively associated 
with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees 
 
According to agency theory, institutional directors will act independently from the insider directors and 
will act as good monitors to protect the shareholders’ interests, mitigating agency problems between 
shareholders and managers (Hsu and Wu 2014). Institutional investors have greater expertise and 
resources in companies and, therefore, they have strong incentives to monitor managers (Hsu and Wu 
2014). Some investigations support this thesis, as authors such as Wan Nordin Wan-Hussin (2009) 
reports that institutional directors reduce fraudulent accounting practices, increase corporate 
transparency and publish unbiased or less biased information, among other things. Consequently, this 
argument exposes a positive relationship between institutional directors on BDs and the voluntary 
formation of Board Sub-committees, because they play a complementary role in governance 
mechanisms.  
However, contrary to this argument, another research (Raj Varma 2001) demonstrates that institutional 
directors are passive, and their role of monitoring managers is ineffective, because they prefer not to 
actively monitor the managers of a company in which they have invested, due to a conflict of interest 
arising from their existing business relations with the company (Pascal Frantz and Norvald Instefjord 
2009), and because of their relatively myopic goals (institutional investors focus on short-term 
corporate performance) (Brian J. Bushee 1998), because of the free-rider problem (Anat R.Admati, Paul 
Pfleiderer, and Josef Zechner 1994) or because they do not have the capability (William Taylor 1990). 
In this line, John Pound (1993) shows that institutional shareholders empathise with the entrenched 
managers and vote for them. Consistent with these views, John Pound (1988) posits that institutional 
investors may align themselves with incumbent managers due to strategic alliances or existing 
relationships between them and, then, this leads to a decline in corporate monitoring. Accordingly, these 
arguments support a negative relationship between institutional directors and the setting up of Board 
Sub-committees, because institutional investors may cooperate with managers and enjoy the private 
benefits of control or preserve their business relations with their firms and, as a consequence, they are 
less motivated to monitor their governance. Additionally, institutional investors may entrench 
themselves and, therefore, achieve absolute control of the companies and extract private benefits, 
negatively impacting corporate monitoring. Consistent with this idea, Karen Van Nuys (1993) 
demonstrates that institutional directors on BDs support managers’ decisions and collude with 
management.  
Female directors, according to agency perspective, may act as a mechanism to control managers (Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Carter et al. 2003; Adams and Ferreira 2009), which may mitigate agency costs 
(Francoeur et al. 2008; Adams and Ferreira 2009). Prior research (Hang Dong 2014) provides evidence 
that institutional female directors may improve managerial monitoring because they improve firm 
performance, which is considered to be a financial mechanism of managerial discipline. Hence, the 
combination of gender diversity and institutional directors on BDs may increase the voluntary formation 
of Board Sub-committees. Nevertheless, other studies show that institutional female directors on BDs 
may not have the time or expertise to act as effective monitors and, thus, they could increase agency 
costs (Pound 1988; Phillip J. McKnight and Charlie Weir 2009). Accordingly, institutional female 
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directors may use their aptitudes for their private benefit and align themselves with managers, reducing 
the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees (Elizabeth Carson 2002).  
In consequence, based on the above heterogeneous arguments, we hypothesise that institutional female 
directors may be negative or positively associated with the voluntary formation of Board Sub-
committees, because they may demand more control mechanisms in order to exert more direct control 
over the management team, reducing information asymmetries and, as a consequence, agency costs (R. 
Aggarwal, Isil Erel, Miguel Ferreira, Pedro Matos 2011). But, the opposite may be also expected, 
according to prior literature. 
Thus, we posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
 Hypothesis 4: Institutional female directors on Boards of Directors are positive or negatively 
associated with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees 
 
Ownership structure can reduce agency costs by actively monitoring (Neal M. Stoughton and Josef 
Zechner 1998) and intervening in the major decisions of the company (McConnel and Servaes 1990).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) used an agency framework to argue that, when corporate insiders 
(managers and board members) have a significant ownership stake, managerial incentives are more 
closely aligned with those of shareholders. Furthermore, when board members control a significant 
stake in the firm, they have a greater incentive to be effective monitors of managerial activity (William 
O. Brown and Michael T. Maloney 1999), and they also will make decisions consistent with 
maximising shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling 1976), because that will maximise their own 
wealth. Thus, increases in the percentage of stock owned by board members should make them more 
sensitive to monitor unethical and opportunistic behaviors due to the negative impact that they may 
have on shareholders’ interests; consequently, board members with ownership will be more likely to 
demand the setting up of Board Sub-committees. Therefore, board members’ ownership serves as an 
important means of controlling agency problems. In this vein, prior research (M. Ameziane Lasfer 
2006) shows that management ownership causes a greater alignment of interests between owners and 
managers, reducing agency problems.  
Focusing on agency theory, women directors may make existing control mechanisms over managers 
stronger, because women directors increase board independence, and they are inclined to ask many 
questions (Carter et al. 2010). Thus, women directors on BDs may monitor management more 
effectively than men directors (Srinidhi et al. 2011) because their perspectives are more wide-ranging 
and their decision-making process is more extensive and, as a result, this may also lead to a higher 
demand for control mechanisms. Stakeholder theory posits that female directors will defend the 
interests of all stakeholders, avoiding problematic confrontations and providing different opinions and 
perspectives to board discussions, as well as more responsive policies. In addition, females behave more 
ethically than men in a business context (Helena Isidro and Márcia Sobral 2015) and are less likely to 
engage in unethical behaviour (Maria L. Roxas and Jane Y. Stoneback 2004). Thus, women on 
corporate boards will be more proactive about avoiding unethical behaviours. These theses support the 
view that female directors on BDs with shares will have the potential to help align the incentives of 
shareholders and managers though their impact on the voluntary formation of Board Sub-committees.  
Therefore, based on the above arguments, we posit that the proportion of shares held by women 
directors encourages the demand for control mechanisms, and they may be positively associated with 
the voluntary formation of Board Sub-committees.  
Hence, we posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
 Hypothesis 5: The percentage of shares held by female directors on a Board of Directors is 
positively associated with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees 
 
4. Empirical Design  
4.1. Sample 
The initial sample of this study consists of all non-financial firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange 
during 2004–2011. Financial firms have been excluded from the sample because they comply with 
particular accounting rules. The information used for this analysis was obtained from the public records 
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of the Spanish Securities Market Committee (CNMV), the SABI database and the official websites of 
firms, while corporate governance information was collected from the annual corporate governance 
reports. 
We built an unbalanced panel of 910 firm-year observations. Nevertheless, the estimations based on 
unbalanced panels are as reliable as those based on balanced panels (Manuel Arellano 2003). 
 
4.2. Variables 
The dependent variable (CDCA) will take the value 1 if the BD has voluntarily constituted all or some 
of the Committees recommended by the Codes of GCG (Executive Committee and Oversight and 
Control Committee: Nomination and Remuneration Committee and/or Compliance Committees or 
Corporate Governance) and 0, otherwise. The Audit Committee is not studied in this work, because it is 
a Board Sub-committee that is mandatory, rather than voluntary. Moreover, we also study how gender 
diversity in BDs can influence the voluntary creation of an Executive Committee, on the one hand, and 
some or all of the Committees for Oversight and Control, on the other. Thus, this paper tests three 
models. In Model 1, the dependent variable CDCA analyses all Committees recommended by the CGG, 
taking the value 1 if the BD has voluntarily created all or some of the Board Sub-committees and 0, 
otherwise. In Model 2, the dependent variable CDCA (named CDCA1) takes the value 1 if the BD has 
voluntarily established an Executive Committee and 0, otherwise. Finally, in Model 3, the dependent 
variable CDCA (named CDCA2) takes the value 1 if the BD has voluntarily established a Committee 
for Oversight and Control: a Nomination and Remuneration Committees and/or the Compliance 
Committee or Corporate Governance and 0, otherwise. 
The independent variables about board gender diversity (women, independent women, institutional 
women and executive women) have been calculated in two ways: (1) as percentage or proportion, 
instead of absolute value, because they have much more explicative and comparative power than 
absolute numbers, and (2) using the Peter Michael Blau’s index (1977). We define the percentage of 
female directors on BDs as MCA, and it is calculated as the ratio between the total number of women 
who make up the BD and the total number of members on the BD. The MICA variable represents the 
percentage of independent women on BDs, and it is calculated as the ratio between the total numbers of 
independent women on BDs and the total number of independent members on BDs. The variable 
MECA represents the percentage of executive women on BDs, and it is calculated as the ratio between 
the total number of executive women directors on BDs and the total number of executive directors on 
BDs. The percentage of institutional female directors on BDs is defined as MDCA, and it is calculated 
as the ratio between the total number of institutional female directors on BDs and the total number of 
institutional directors on BDs. In addition, and in line with previous studies (Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera 2008; Toyah Miller and María del Carmen Triana 2009), board gender diversity (women directors, 
independent female directors, executive female directors and institutional female directors) is also 
measured with Blau’s (1977) index of heterogeneity. Blau’s index has been frequently used and noted 
as an appropriate measure of board gender diversity for categorical variables (David A.Harrison and H. 
Sin 2006). Blau’s index of heterogeneity is calculated as (1-∑pí2), where pí is the proportion of group 
members in each of the í number of categories. The range of the index is dependent upon the number of 
categories, where the number ranges from 0 to (í-1)/í. Thus, Blau’s index can range from 0, when there 
is only one gender on the board, to 0.50, when there are equal numbers of men and women on the 
board. Therefore, using Blau’s index, we define MCA_Blau Index as Blau’s index of women/men 
directors on BDs, MICA_Blau Index as Blau’s index of women/men independent directors on BDs, 
MECA_Blau Index as Blau’s index of women/men insider or executive directors on BDs and 
MDCA_Blau Index as Blau’s index of women/men institutional directors on BDs. The variable 
ACCWOM defines the percentage of shares held by women directors on BDs, and it is calculated as the 
percentage of shares held by women directors on BDs.  
We control for a number of factors supported by previous evidence that can impact on the voluntary 
establishment of Board Sub-committees. TAMCA is the board size and is calculated as the total number 
of members on the BD. REUNCA is the activity of the board of directors, measured as the total number 
of meetings of the BD. TAMEMPR is the natural logarithm of total assets and is a measure of firm size. 
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ANTEMPR is calculated as the logarithm of the difference between the year of establishment of the 
firm and the observation year, and represents the firm’s age. CEO duality is defined as DPC, which is 
calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if one person holds both positions as chairman of 
the BD and CEO and 0, otherwise. BIGFOUR is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the firm is audited by a major accounting firm (Ernst & Young, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Deloitte 
and KPMG) and 0, otherwise. LEV is the financial leverage variable, calculated as the ratio of book 
value of debt to total assets. Finally, OWNCON is the ownership concentration and is measured as the 
proportion of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of the firm’s stock. In Table 1 we provide 
all the variables used and the expected sign for each one.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents mean value, median, standard error, and percentiles 25 and 75 of the main variables. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
As shown in Table 2, the average percentage of women on BDs is 7%. Moreover, it is observed that, of 
all women who are on BDs, 6.40% are independent directors, 1.90% are executive directors and 8.1% 
are institutional directors. In addition, we appreciate that the average Blau’s index of women/men on 
BDs is 0.11, the Blau’s index of women/men independent directors on BDs is 0.075, the Blau’s index of 
women/men executive directors on BDs is 0.022, and the Blau’s index of women/men institutional 
directors on BDs is 0.082, where the highest possible Blau’s index gender diversity score was 0.5, if the 
board had equal numbers of men and women on the board and the ownership of the firm held by women 
directors on BDs is 2.2. Also, it can be seen that a BD, on average, is formed of 10.50 members and 
meets 9.57 times a year. The average size of firms in the sample is 13.00 (logarithm of total assets), the 
average age of firms is 3.55 years, and finally, the level of leverage is 54%. Moreover, the statistics 
reveal that 84% of companies have voluntarily constituted all or some of the Board Sub-committees, 
36% created an Executive Committee, and 83% voluntarily formed a Committee for Supervision and 
Control. Furthermore, in 25% of the firms in the sample, the chairman of the BD is also the CEO, and 
86% of firms are audited by one of the big auditing firms. Finally, the data show that ownership 
concentration is, on average, 41.30%.  
 
5.2. Regression Results 
In Table 3, we show the results of the logistic regression when measuring board gender diversity as a 
percentage or proportion. As can be observed, we have built three models. In Model 1, we examined 
whether the BD has voluntarily formed all or some of the Board Sub-committees. In Model 2, we 
examined whether the BD has voluntarily established an Executive Committee, and in Model 3, we 
observed whether the BD has voluntarily created a Committee for Supervision and Control, that is, if 
they have formed Appointments and Remuneration and/or Compliance or Corporate Governance 
Committees. The Chi-square test shows that all three models are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The results in Table 3 show that, for Model 1, the variable percentage of women directors on the BD 
(MCA_Proportion) has a positive sign, but it is not statistically significant; hence, we reject the first 
hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that the percentage of women directors on BDs has no impact on the 
formation of all or some of the Board Sub-committees. This result could be explained by the fact that 
the percentage of female directors on BDs is not an essential feature for the firms listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange, as evidenced by Elena Merino-Madrid,  Montserrat Manzaneque-Lizano, and Regino 
Banegas-Ochovo (2009), so that the percentage of female directors on BDs is not a relevant factor in the 
establishment of all or some of the Board Sub-committees. The variable percentage of independent 
female directors on BDs (MICA_Proportion) shows a positive sign, as predicted, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (see Yusuf Ekrem Akbas, Mehmet Senturk, and Canan Sancar 2013). Hence, 
we cannot reject the second hypothesis. This permits us to conclude that the presence of independent 
women directors on BDs increases the probability of the voluntary formation of all or some of the 
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Board Sub-committees. Furthermore, the variable percentage of women executive directors on BDs 
(MECA_Proportion) is statistically significant and presents the expected sign. Thus, we cannot reject 
the third hypothesis. This finding suggests that a higher percentage of executive female directors on 
BDs has a negative effect on the voluntary setting up of all or some of the Board Sub-committees. The 
variable percentage of institutional female directors (MDCA_Proportion) presents the expected sign, 
but it is not statistically significant. Therefore, we reject the fourth hypothesis. This result is in line with 
those reported by Wan-Hussin (2009) and Hsu and Wu (2014), who showed that the presence of 
institutional female directors on BDs brings transparency and a greater ability to report and monitor the 
management team and, therefore, the creation of Board Sub-committees is not necessary. This finding 
suggests that there is a substitution effect between the percentage of institutional women directors on 
BDs and the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees. The variable percentage of shares held by 
women directors (ACCWOM) is not statistically significant. Thus, the fifth hypothesis has to be 
rejected.  
Regarding the control variables, we note that the variables BD size (TAMCA), BD activity (REUNCA), 
firm size (TAMEMPR) and audit firm (BIGFOUR) have a positive sign, as predicted, and are 
statistically significant. In addition, the variable duality of Chairman and CEO has a positive sign, 
contrary to what was expected, and is statistically significant.  
The results of Model 2 demonstrate that the variables percentage of executive women directors 
(MECA_Proportion) and the percentage of shares held by women directors on BDs present a negative 
and positive sign, respectively, as expected, and are statistically significant. Hence, we cannot reject the 
third and fifth hypotheses. Therefore, we can conclude that, as the percentage of shares held by female 
directors on BDs increases, the greater is the probability of the creation of an Executive Committee on 
the BD, while a higher percentage of female executive directors on the BD reduces that likelihood. 
Carson (2002) obtained similar results, demonstrating the positive relationship between the 
shareholdings of directors and the formation of a Remuneration Committee. R. A. G. Monks and N. 
Minow (2004) argued that high equity ownership by directors is an important factor in increasing the 
willingness of directors to monitor. The remainder of the independent variables are not statistically 
significant. 
The control variables BD size, firm size, firm age, and CEO duality show the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. Thus, we can conclude that the probability of creating an Executive Committee 
on the BD will increase in larger and older firms, whose BDs are large, while this probability is reduced 
with CEO duality. The other control variables are not significant. 
Model 3 shows that the variables percentage of independent female directors on BDs and percentage of 
executive female directors on BDs offer a positive and negative sign, respectively, as expected, and are 
statistically significant. Hence, we cannot reject the second and third hypotheses. Therefore, according 
to these results, we can conclude that the percentage of independent women directors on BDs increases 
the voluntary establishment of a Committee for Supervision and Control, while the percentage of 
executive female directors decreases this likelihood. The rest of the independent variables are not 
statistically significant. With respect to the control variables, we obtained similar results to Model 1. 
BD size and activity, firm size and auditing firms are statistically significant and show a positive sign, 
as predicted. Thus, these findings suggest that there is a greater likelihood of the creation of a voluntary 
Supervision and Control Committee as BD size and activity, firm size and audits of a firm by one of the 
big audit firms increase. Moreover, the variable CEO duality has a positive sign, contrary to our 
expectations, but is statistically significant. Accordingly, this result suggests that CEO duality 
encourages the voluntary creation of Committees for Supervision and Control. In the same vein, Gerald 
Chau and Patrick Leung (2006) also documented that CEO duality increases the likelihood of the 
creation of a Committee for Supervision and Control. The other control variables are not statistically 
significant. 
In Table 4, we show the results of the logistic regression when measuring board gender diversity with 
Blau’s index. As can be observed, we have built three models, as in Table 3. The Chi-square test shows 
that all three models are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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As observed in Table 4, for Model 1, only the variable representing independent female directors on 
boards with the Blau index shows the expected sign and is statistically significant. Thus, this finding 
supports the second hypothesis. The rest of the independent variables are not statistically significant. 
Consistent with Model 1 in Table 3, where board gender diversity is measured with proportions, the 
control variables board size and activity, firm size, duality and auditing firm are statistically significant. 
Thus, we cannot reject the second hypothesis, and the remainder of the hypotheses cannot be supported 
by the findings. Our results suggest that independent women directors on boards measured with the 
Blau index increase the likelihood of the voluntary creation of all or some of the Board Sub-committees.  
As in Model 2, when board gender diversity is measured as a proportion, executive female directors on 
BDs and the percentage of shares held by female directors on BDs provide the predicted sign and are 
statistically significant. These findings support the third and fifth hypotheses, and therefore, they 
suggest that the percentage of executive women directors on BDs is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of setting up an Executive Committee, while a higher percentage of shares held by female 
directors on BDs has a positive effect on the voluntary creation of an Executive Committee. The rest of 
the independent variables are not statistically significant. The control variables show the same direction 
and significance as in Model 2, when board gender diversity is measured as a percentage.  
Finally, in Model 3, in comparison to board gender diversity proportion, only the independence of 
female directors on BDs presents the expected sign and is statistically significant. Thus, our results 
support the second hypothesis, but not the remainder of the hypotheses. Therefore, the findings suggest 
that independent female directors on BDs are positively associated with the probability of the voluntary 
formation of a Committee for Supervision and Control.  
To test for multicollinearity, we calculated the Spearman correlation coefficients for all of the variables 
included in the model. Table 5 presents the results for the correlation matrix. An analysis of this table 
shows that the correlation between some pairs of variables is statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10% 
levels. These results are consistent with previous studies concerning the voluntary formation of Board 
Sub-committees (Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes-Barbera 2008). However, none of the correlation 
coefficients are high enough (> 80) to cause significant problems of multicollinearity (see Deborah 
Archambeault and F. Todd DeZoort 2001), except for the pairs MCA_P/MCA_B, MICA_P/MICA_B, 
MECA_P/MECA_B and MDCA_P/MDCA_B (we do not include them together in the regressions), so 
that multicolinearity should not be a concern. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to determine whether gender diversity in BDs of firms listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange influences the voluntary formation of Board Sub-committees. Our study provides 
evidence that independent women directors in decision-making bodies of firms encourage the 
delegation by BDs of functions to Board Sub-committees, which play a crucial role in monitoring 
management. In addition, a high percentage of women executive directors on BDs could be seen as a 
substitute for an Executive Committee, and to avoid duplication of functions, they would be more 
reluctant to create this Committee. On the other hand, the percentage of shares held by female directors 
(proportion and Blau’s index models) has a positive effect on the voluntary creation of an Executive 
Committee since the ownership structure encourages the voluntary setting-up of control mechanisms 
such as Board Sub-committees (Stoughton and Zechner 1998). Finally, the findings report that women 
directors (without distinguishing the type of directorship) and institutional female directors (proportion 
and Blau’s index) do not contribute to the voluntary creation of all or some of the Board Sub-
committees or to the formation of an Executive Committee and a Committee for Supervision and 
Control. One explanation for the lack of impact of women directors could be that, when they are 
analysed as a whole, this directorship is composed of different kinds of directors, and therefore, it is 
possible that opposite effects compensate, and consequently, the whole effect is null. Focusing on the 
lack of effect of institutional female directors, this could be due to institutional female directors may 
align with management, and therefore, it is less likely that these directors demand control mechanisms 
such as Board Sub-committe (Andres Almazán, Jay C. Hartzell, and Laura T. Starks 2005) 
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This analysis has several implications. Our findings are relevant for Spanish policymakers who 
prescribe actions regarding the presence of women in decision-making bodies of companies, 
particularly in top positions, regarding corporate governance structures to guarantee the protection of 
the stakeholders, especially shareholders, and regarding the voluntary setting-up of Board Sub-
committees. Independent female directors on boards and ownership by women directors encourage the 
demand for Board Sub-committees; therefore, this result supports Act3/2007 (The Equality Law), which 
encourages Spanish boards of listed companies to reach a gender quota of 40% by 2015. Thus, our 
evidence supports the legislative initiative to establish quotas for women in corporate governance 
bodies of firms (e.g., as set by the European Union Justice Committee and the Financial Reporting 
Council at the end of 2010 and the Spanish Act 3/2007 of 22 March, for Effective Equality between 
Women and Men), based on the premise that some characteristics of gender diversity in Spanish BDs 
(independence and ownership by women directors) encourage the voluntary creation of Board Sub-
committees. This point of view is supported by Mehdi Nekhili and Hayette Gatfaoui (2012). In addition, 
the results are also important for researchers who examine the role of women in decision-making bodies 
and their influence on different outcomes of the companies, and specifically, for those authors who 
show that women in decision-making bodies have an important influence on the fostering of good 
corporate practice (Burgess and Tharenou 2002), among other things.  
Our results suggest that women in top positions are neither “walk-on actors” nor “trophy wives”, as 
previous research, which does not find a relationship between women in executive positions and 
financial reporting quality or dividend policy, may suggest. Thus, these findings provide evidence of the 
need to continue researching issues about women in corporate governance, especially in the 
international context, as a comparison of our results with other legal, cultural, professional and 
regulatory environments would enrich the debate about gender diversity in corporate governance. In 
short, both policymakers and researchers should no longer consider gender diversity as a whole, 
because the composition of gender diversity has various implications for the voluntary creation of 
Board Sub-committees.  
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Table 1 Variable Description 
 
Variable   Description   
Expected 
Sign in the 
three 
models 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES   
MCA_Proportion  
Number of women in BD/Total number of members in BD  
 + 
MCA_Blau Index  Blau’s index of women/men directors in BD + 
MICA_Proportion  
 
Number of independent women in BD/ Total number of independent 
members in BD 
 
+ 
MICA_Blau Index  Blau’s index of women/men independent directors in BD + 
MECA_Proportion  
 




MECA_Blau Index  Blau’s index of women/men insider directors in BD - 
MDCA_Proportion  
 
Number of institutional women in BD/ Total number of institutional 
members in BD 
 
+/- 
MDCA_Blau Index  
Blau’s index of women/men institutional directors in BD 
 +/- 
ACCWOM  
Shares held by women of BD 
 + 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
TAMCA  
Total number of directors in BD 
 + 
REUNCA  
Number of times BD meets per year 
 + 
TAMEMPR  
Log of total assets (in thousands of Euros) 
 + 
ANTEMPR  
Log of the difference between setting-up firm and observation year  
 +/- 
DPC  
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as 








LEV   Ratio of book value of debt over total assets  - 
OWNCON   Proportion of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of the firm’s stock - 
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Table 2 Main Descriptive Statistics 
 
a) Continuous Variables      
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. P25 P75 
MCA_Proportion 910 0.070 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.111 
MICA_Proportion 910 0.064 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 
MECA_Proportion 910 0.019 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.000 
MDCA_Proportion 910 0.081 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.100 
MCA_Blau Index 910 0.113 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.197 
MICA_Blau Index 910 0.075 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.000 
MECA_Blau Index 910 0.022 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 
MDCA_Blau Index 910 0.082 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.117 
ACCWOM 910 0.022 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.006 
TAMCA 910 10.502 10.000 3.823 8.000 12.000 
REUNCA 910 9.577 9.000 5.045 7.000 12.000 
TAMEMPR 910 13.006 12.811 1.880 11.700 14.341 
ANTEMPR 910 3.553 3.690 0.952 2.944 4.174 
LEV 910 0.540 0.510 0.620 0.270 0.693 
OWNCON 910 0.413 0.403 0.282 0.151 0.633 
b) Dummy Variables           
      0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
CDCA     144  16% 766 84% 
CDCA1   586 64% 324 36% 
CDCA2   154 17% 756 83% 
DPC   682 75% 228 25% 
BIGFOUR      127 14% 783 86% 
Mean, median, standard deviation and percentiles of the main variables. CDCA: dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established all or 
some of the Committees recommended by the Good Governance Code (CGG); CDCA1: dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has 
established an Executive Committee; CDCA2: dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established a Supervision and Control Committee: 
a Nomination and Compensation Committee and/or a Compliance or Corporate Governance Committee; MCA_Proportion: Percentage of 
female directors on BD’s; MICA_Proportion: Percentage of independent female directors on BD’s; MECA_Proportion: Percentage of 
executive female directors on BD’s; MDCA_Proportion: Percentage of institutional female directors on BD’s; MCA_Blau Index is the 
measure for women/men directors on board; MICA_Blau Index is the measure for independent women/men directors on board; 
MECA_Blau Index is the measure for executive women/men directors on board; MDCA_Blau Index is the measure for institutional 
women/men directors on board; ACCWOM: Percentage of shares held by women directors on BD’s; TAMCA: BD size measured as the 
total number of directors in BD’s; REUNCA: BD activity measured as the number of times that the BD meets per year; TAMEMPR: Firm 
size measured as the log of the total assets of the firm (in thousands of Euros); ANTEMPR: Firm age measured as the log of the difference 
between setting-up of the firm and observation year; DPC: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO 
and Chairman on BD’s; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the big auditing firms; LEV: Leverage 

















































































MICA_Proportion + 3.439*** (0.580)  
MECA_Proportion - -1.525* (-0.257)  
MDCA_Proportion +/- -0.581 (-0.098)  
ACCWOM + 0.004 (0.001)  
TAMCA + 0.096*** (0.016)  
REUNCA + 0.074*** (0.012)  
TAMEMPR + 0.260*** (0.043)  
ANTEMPR - -0.072 (-0.012)  
DPC - 0.684*** (0.115)  
BIGFOUR + 0.302* (0.050)  













































































































MICA_Blau + 2.641*** (0.448)  
MECA_Blau - 0.931 (0.158)  
MDCA_Blau +/- 0.098 (0.016)  
ACCWOM + -0.001 (-0.000)  
TAMCA + 0.091*** (0.015)  
REUNCA + 0.073*** (0.012)  
TAMEMPR + 0.255*** (0.043)  
ANTEMPR - -0.080 (-0.013)  
DPC - 0.657*** (0.111)  
BIGFOUR + 0.346** (0.058)  
















Table 5 Correlation Matrix. 
 
  CDCA CDCA1 CDCA2 MECA_B MDCA_B MICA_B MCA_B MCA_P MICA_P MECA_P MDCA_P REMUCA TAMCA REUNCA TAMEMPR ANTEMPR DPC BIGFOUR LEV 
CDCA1 0.322*** 
                 CDCA2 0.467*** 0.280*** 
                MECA_B 0.048 -0.072 ** 0.054 
                MDCA_B -0.042 -0.082** 0.058* 0.089*** 
               
MICA_B 0.193 *** 0.190  *** 0.197 *** 
-0.105 
*** -0.061 * 
              
MCA_B 0.170 *** 0.150 *** 0.188 *** 0.289 *** 0.560 *** 
0.494 
*** 
             
MCA_P 0.120 *** 0.122 *** 0.139 *** 0.318 *** 0.609 *** 
0.498 
*** 0.926*** 
            
MICA_P 0.198 *** 0.175 *** 0.201 *** 
-0.093 




*** 0.515 *** 
           




*** 0.323 *** -0.097 *** 
         
MDCA_P -0.005 0.085 ** -0.022 0.093 *** 0.927 *** -0.035  
0.613 
*** 0.665 *** -0.026  0.085 ** 
         




*** 0.390 *** 
0.385 
*** 0.019 0.155 *** 
        
TAMCA 0.325 *** 0.421 *** 0.336 *** 
-0.134 








*** 0.093 *** 0.169 *** 
      








*** -0.076 ** 0.115 *** 0.232 *** 
     




*** 0.070 ** 
0.195 




*** 0.293 *** 
    
ANTEMPR -0.023 -0.042 -0.035 
-0.155 








*** 0.066 ** -0.003 0.078 ** 0.025 0.119 *** 
    
DPC 0.135 *** -0.050 0.134 *** 0.093 ** -0.063 -0.053 0.031 0.031 -0.055* 
0.086 
*** -0.000 -0.025 -0.051 0.051 0.022 0.006 
   
BIGFOUR 0.345 *** 0.161 *** 0.324 *** 0.068 ** 0.040 0.088 * 
0.090 
*** 0.086 *** 
0.094 
*** 0.071 ** 0.017  0.129 *** 
0.289 




LEV 0.077 ** 0.054  0.080 ** 0.017 0.127 *** 
-0.080 
** 0.029 0.008 
-0.008 
** 0.002 0.117 *** -0.002 
0.188 




OWCON 0.016 0.035 0.028 0.068* -0.000 -0.001 
-
0.101*** -0.068 ** -0.007 0.077 ** -0.032 -0.040 0.017 -0.081 ** 0.172 *** 0.049  -0.030 0.020 0.022 
 
